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Between 1990 and 2018 Chile experienced one of Latin America’s most dramatic declines in party
identification, from 80% in the early 1990s to less than 20% in 2016. This decline seems puzzling
as it coincided with outstanding economic performance, low perceived corruption levels, and an
institutionalized party system. This paper argues, and finds quantitative evidence that the decline
is related to the short-lived nature of identity-based bonds between parties and citizens generated
by the country’s authoritarian experience (1973-1990). This cleavage decreased after 2000 as
right-wing parties distanced themselves from the authoritarian regime for electoral purposes.
Their actions ultimately undermined the links between all the main political parties and their
constituencies. More broadly, the paper concludes that unless political identities are continually
reinforced by political actors they are unlikely to remain stable sources of identification.
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INTRODUCTION
The academic debate on party identification, broadly speaking, has centered around two
competing views of partisanship, an instrumental one and an expressive one Huddy et al. (2015).
The first claims that fluctuations in partisanship are strongly associated with economic and
political performance. While strong performance enhances party identification, weak performance
drives citizens away from political parties Fiorina (1981); MacKuen et al. (1989). From this
perspective, the nature of the relationship between parties and citizens is mainly instrumental
and on-going, as citizens evaluate parties over time and choose the ones they believe are most
likely to benefit them Lupu (2013).
The second one maintains that the link between the general public and political parties works
through a sense of belonging, as groups are emotionally attached to their parties’: “Social
identification involves comparing a judgment about oneself and with one’s perception of a social
group” (Green et al., 2002, p.8). From this point of view, partisan self-conceptions closely
resemble religious or ethnic identification. In this sense, partisanship would be a meaningful part
of citizen conceptions of themselves, and we would expect enduring attachments among partisans.
Unlike instrumental attachments, driven by evaluations of party performance and therefore highly
unsteady, social identities should provide a stable basis for party support Lupu (2016).
The Chilean post-authoritarian political landscape is not explained by either of these two
theoretical models of partisanship. Since the restoration of political democracy in 1989, Chile has
experienced overall an outstanding economic and political performance, especially in comparative
Latin American perspective. Between 1990 and 2006, the country’s poverty rate dropped from
38.6% to 13.7% Casen (2006), and according to the World Bank, from 1990 to 2010, the country’s
GDP per capita tripled. Although Chile has not been fully immune from corruption scandals
involving top political leaders, in terms of over-all corruption control, Chile is viewed as having
one of the best, if not the best, performance in the region1 Mungiu-Pippidi (2017). Additionally,
1According to Mungiu-Pippidi, Chile scores 8.1 in the Control of Corruption Index (recoded from 1 to 10), followed
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the center-left Concertación coalition, which governed the country continuously from 1990 to
2010, managed to strengthen democracy over time, particularly by dismantling several
authoritarian enclaves that the military regime had incorporated into the constitution approved
in 1980 while they were in power Luna and Mardones (2010).
At the same time, the Chilean political party system has proven to be one of the most
longstanding and stable party systems in the world Valenzuela (1995). As several scholars have
argued, since 1925, and even following the period of military rule and interrupted democracy
(1973-1990), the Chilean party system has had a remarkable consistency in voting patterns, with
an electorate historically divided in three distinct tendencies: left, center, and right Angell (2003);
Valenzuela and Scully (1997).
The stability of these three tendencies in the Chilean electorate is a consequence of how these
divisions have been able to develop strong roots in society, resulting in collective memories and
identities institutionalized in social organizations and institutions Valenzuela and Scully (1997).
This have led scholars to characterize Chile as one of the strongest and most cohesive party
systems in the region Diamond et al. (1999).
The presence of both outstanding economic and political performance and a deeply rooted and
structured party system would lead us to expect that partisanship would remain high in Chile
into the present. Yet, there is considerable evidence pointing towards the opposite direction. For
example, over the 1990-2018 period, national representative surveys from the Center of Public
Studies 2 (CEP) show that identification with political parties has experienced a sharp downturn
from 80% in the early 1990s to less than 20% at its lowest point during 2016. According to Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys, partisanship in Chile was under 10% in
2010, and over 2006 to 2012 Chile has consistently been one of the two countries with the lowest
levels of partisanship in the region Lupu (2015).
Furthermore, during this period we see declining rates of executive approval and trust in
institutions. Data from CEP show that the last two presidents achieved the lowest approval rates
since the restoration of democracy -at their lowest point, both approval rates were near 20%-. At
by Uruguay (7.8) and Costa Rica (6.6). According to the World Bank, Control of Corruption captures “Perceptions
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.” ?.
2Centro de Estudios Públicos.
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the same time, political institutions have also experienced a growing rates of public distrust: for
example, distrust in Congress grew from 7.8% in 1990 to 28.7% in 2011. Finally, political parties
and the congress are among the least trusted institutions in the country Bargsted and Maldonado
(2018).
All these features together make the Chilean case quite puzzling, as it does not fit the prediction
of either of the two main theoretical perspectives on partisanship. While instrumental approaches
focused on party performance would predict this dramatic decline in party attachments in
contexts of deep economic, social or political crisis, which were not present in the country during
this time period, expressive perspectives that claim that partisanship is a form of social identity
also are unable to explain the partisan decline of the past thirty years3.
How can we explain the dramatic decline in party identification with the simultaneous occurrence
of outstanding performance and a strong and highly institutionalized party system?
This article argues that the emergence of new expressive ties between political parties and citizens
during the authoritarian period (1973-1990), which then became increasingly unstable following
the return to democracy, provide the best explanation for the Chilean case of dramatic decline in
party identification. In other words, the authoritarian experience created identity-based bonds
between parties and citizens which ended being short-lived. This article provides evidence
regarding the existence of these unstable expressive ties between political parties and citizens
since the 1990 return to democracy in Chile. In sum, this article argues that the authoritarian
period created bonds between parties and citizens that are identity based, but were only
short-lived, a possibility that has been overlooked in the existing literature on partisanship
?cf.¿green1994, green2002, huddy2015, kalin2018.
Following previous research, I argue that the post-1990 Chilean political landscape is strongly
shaped by the political legacies of the authoritarian period Huneeus and Maldonado (2003);
Tironi and Agüero (1999); Tironi et al. (2001); Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) and that in the face
of continuing democratic electoral competition these legacies play a key role in the decrease of the
level of partisanship.
3The public demonstrations that begun in October 2019 in Chile are outside the time scope of this analysis.
Possibly, they could be explained, in part, by the country’s current low levels of partisanship and high levels of
partisan distrust.
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In particular, I argue that the previous authoritarian period (1973-1990) gave rise to two distinct
and antagonistic political identities: on one side, the supporters of the military dictatorship, and
on the other, the advocates of democracy. These identities grew over the 1980s and were clearly
established by the 1988 plebiscite and were embodied by the two main political coalitions of the
post-authoritarian period: the center-left coalition Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia
and the right-wing coalition Alianza por Chile. My main claim is that these two identities not
only shaped the political landscape after the 1988 plebiscite, but also are a fundamental element
to understand the current low levels of partisanship in Chile.
In the pages below, I provide evidence that the decrease of partisan identification in the Chilean
post-authoritarian context can be largely explained by the efforts of the right-wing parties to
distance themselves from the authoritarian regime and the figure of the former dictator Augusto
Pinochet. This effort, initially motivated by the desire to improve the electoral performance of the
right- wing parties, eventually undermined the basis of the linkages between these parties and
their core public. Increasingly and very quickly, it also weakened the bonds between the center
and left-wing partisans and their parties.
These two identities were forged based on their relationship with the military dictatorship, and
thus in opposition with each other. Thus, the right-wing coalition’s effort to distance itself from
Augusto Pinochet did not only undermine the basis on which they related with their own
constituency (the support of the dictator). At the same time, this effort harmed the narrative on
which the left-wing coalition developed their links with their own political base (the opposition to
the dictatorship).
In summary, what I argue is that without a set of parties basing their central identity for their
core supporters around the defense of the past military regime, the opposition to that regime
quickly lost a key narrative fostering partisanship among the center and center-left population.
This does not mean that presidential approval and economic and political shocks do not have any
effect over the short-term changes on party identification, but that the overall decreasing trend in
partisanship is better explained when we focus on the way in which political parties distanced
themselves from the critical cleavage that articulates the Chilean party system.
The rest of this article continues as follows: in the next section, a brief literature review based on
the main findings on partisanship in the United States context is provided. This section is
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followed by a general characterization of the Chilean context and research conducted in the
country. After that, I present my main claim. Given that my theory assumes that in the 1990s
there were two salient political identities (democrats and supporters of the authoritarian regime),
in that section I present some evidence of that. The following section introduces my hypothesis
and two potential alternative explanations. After that I present the data, variable
operationalization and methods. The result section presents both evidence in support of my
hypothesis and evidence contrary to the two other plausible explanations of the decline in
partisanship in Chile. Finally, the article ends with some general conclusions regarding the nature
of partisanship and some questions for further research.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Within the party identification literature, there is an important disagreement regarding the
nature of political attachments. In general terms, we can group the literature into two broad
competing perspectives: an expressive and an instrumental one Huddy et al. (2015); Kalin and
Sambanis (2018).
Instrumental Approach
The instrumental perspective holds the intuition that citizen party identification is strongly
associated with economic and political performance. In Retrospective Voting in American
National Elections 1981, Morris P. Fiorina argues that citizens actively monitor how parties
perform and what they promise over time. Thus, party identification is a summary judgment that
relies both on past experiences and future expectations, it is “a running tally of retrospective
evaluations of party promises and performance” (Fiorina, 1981, p.84). As such, party
identification should vary according to public evaluations of the recent performance of the party
in power: “citizen’s party ID waxes and wanes in accord with his/her perceptions of societal
conditions, political events, and the performance of incumbent officeholders”1981, p.102.
Similarly, Franklin and Jackson 1983 argue that shifts in partisanship can be the result of
unsatisfactory perceptions of incumbent’s party performance.
These models do not necessarily assume that every citizen makes political judgments driven by
economic performance. Rather, as MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989 suggest, if a small
portion of the electorate make judgments in this way, we should expect to see systematic
movement in the aggregate . Accordingly, partisan balance should vary over time even if not all
citizens have a common understanding on how the government is performing.
Although Fiorina 1981 and MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989 provide important insights
regarding the relationship between party identification and economic and political performance,
neither of these theories provides a systematic explanation of the sources of these changes. In
6
other words, it is not clear if the changes in party identification are the product of shifts between
parties or changes in the overall levels of party identification.
However, if incumbent party performance is a key aspect of party identification, we should expect
increasing party identification with the incumbent party in contexts of good economic
performance, due to partisan shifts or shifts by previously unidentified citizens. By contrast, we
should expect migration of partisans from the incumbent party toward other parties or
non-identification in contexts of economic crisis or economic downturns.
Expressive Approach
Conversely, the expressive perspective relies on the assumption that party identification is, to
some extent, exogenous to political contingencies. This view holds that party attachment forms in
early adulthood and become a consistent characteristic of citizens self-conception. It is a form of
social identification and therefore is the result of comparing judgment about oneself with one’s
perception of a social group, in this case, a political party Green et al. (2002). From this
standpoint, the causal link between evaluations and party attachments goes in the exact opposite
direction that the instrumental approach claims. Citizens evaluate from a position based on their
identity. Contrary to the assertion that poor incumbent evaluations result in decreasing
attachments, this perspective argues that party identification is at the base of every given
evaluation.
If partisan attachments are predominantly expressive, contrary to what the instrumental
approach contends, we should not expect levels of party identification to vary due to economic
and political events. In order to have an impact on party attachments, an event should be able to
change the stereotypes and even the identity of a partisan group.
One of the key implications of this perspective is that party attachments should largely be stable
over time: “voters who call themselves Republicans at age thirty-two will most likely continue to
do so at age eighty-two” Green et al. (2002). Partisanship, like religion identification, is unlikely
to change through adulthood. Given that fact, levels of mass partisanship in the population
should stay relatively stable. Accordingly, changes in aggregated levels of partisanship come
primarily from the mobilization of new citizens. Therefore, although we can expect changes in the
party identification over time, these fluctuations should be slow and driven largely by phenomena
7
such as generational replacement and migration.
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THE CHILEAN POST-AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
General Political Context
The end of General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990) marked the beginning of a series
of four consecutive center-left coalition governments that ruled Chile from 1990 to 2010.
Originally meant as a political grouping intended to defeat Pinochet in the national plebiscite of
1988, the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertation) was a political coalition that grouped
the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Social Democratic
Radical Party (PRSD), and the Socialist Party (PS)4. It ruled Chile through the consecutive
governments of Patricio Aylwin (PDC, 1990-1994), Eduardo Fre Ruiz-Tagle (PDC, 1994-2000),
Ricardo Lagos (PS, 2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (PS, 2006-2010).
The Concertation period ended when Sebastián Piñera, supported by the center right-wing
coalition Alliance for Chile (Alliance)5, defeated ex-president Eduardo Frei in the runoff
presidential election of 2010. After that election, the Concertation of Parties for Democracy
coalition dissolved and gave birth to the New Majority coalition, which included the Communist
Party (PC).
Since the first Michelle Bachelet government (2006-2010), the two main Chilean political
coalitions have alternated power. Michelle Bachelet handed the presidential band to Sebastián
Piñera in 2010, who returned to it her in 2014. Finally, Piñera was elected once again in the 2017
presidential election.
The Decline in Partisanship
The early years of the Chilean post-authoritarian political landscape are characterized by high
levels of partisanship. Throughout the presidency of Aylwin, levels of partisanship remained way
4All political parties’ names and acronyms are translated according to Mainwaring 2018 “List of Political Parties
and Coalitions by Country”.
5Alliance is a center-right coalition composed by two major political parties: National Renewal (RN) and right
Union of Independent Democrats (UDI), and, depending of the period, by some minor right-wing political parties.
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over 60%, reaching 86% in December 1992. Figure 1 shows that the subsequent downward trend
in partisanship can be divided into three different periods. First, there is an initial decay from
1994 to the early 2000s, a period that corresponds to Frei’s government, then a second stage of
stabilization around mid-levels of partisanship between the years 2000 and 2006 during the Lagos
administration, and finally, a third stage characterized by the total collapse of the levels of
partisanship between 2006 and 2018. This downward trend hit a record low level of 17% in July
2016, during Michelle Bachelet second term in office.


























































































Source: Center of Public Studies (CEP) Survey
Thus, according to this data, over the past 24 years, the country experienced a dramatic 69
percentage point drop in the levels of partisanship across the country’s population. While before
1994, more than four of every five Chileans considered themselves close to a political party, after
2014, less than one of every five citizens considered themselves partisans.
Most of the data on partisanship available in Chile shows a trend that is consistent with the one
reported by CEP. Figure 2 shows the levels of partisanship reported by five different surveys:
CEP, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Latinobarometer, United Nations
Development Program (PNUD), and the Diego Portales University National Survey6 (UDP).
6Encuesta Nacional Universidad Diego Portales.
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While most of the different sources are quite consistent in their estimations, two estimations
substantially divert from the CEP estimations. First, Latinobarometer estimations between 1995
and 2003 are consistently lower than CEP. These differences are probably due to the universe of
each of these surveys in that particular period of time. While CEP surveys were nationally
representative since 1994, Latinobarometer surveys were representative of only 70% of the
population until 2006, which suggests that the country’s rural population retained higher levels of
partisanship during that period.
Second, LAPOP estimations are way below any other survey reported level of partisanship. The
difference between LAPOP and all other estimations could be due to differences in question
wording. While CEP survey asks: “Considering the following political parties presented in this
card, With which of them do you identify or feel closer?”, LAPOP surveys first use a filter : “Do
you currently identify with a political party?”. Section offers a detailed comparison regarding
wording phrasing, level of representation of the surveys and sampling procedures with regard to
the surveys presented in figure 2.
Regardless of the average levels reflected across the different surveys, overall they show a similar
trend, a strong decline in partisanship in Chile from 2006 to 20187.
7The downward trend recorded by Latinobarometro starts in 2010.
11
Analyzing the Evolution of the Decline in Partisanship
The levels of partisanship were not evenly distributed among parties initially in the early nineties
and similarly, the decrease in partisanship did not occur at the same pace across political parties.
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Figure 3 shows the decreasing levels of partisanship for three different types of political parties.
The first one shows the trend for the centrist Christian Democratic Party, the second one for the
center left political parties (Socialist Party, Party for Democracy and Social Democratic Radical
Party), and the third one for the right-wing political parties (National Renewal and Union of
Independent Democrats). The smoothed lines are locally weighted curves for each one of those
groups, I provide them to allow a easier visualization of the trends.
Under Aylwin’s administration (1990-1994), the PDC maintained high levels of partisanship. In
October 1990, 42.8% of the interviewees identify themselves with the Christian Democratic Party,
more than the left and right partisans combined. However, PDC partisanship began to decline in
1994, and by September 1999, the levels of partisanship of the PDC were for first time exceeded
by both the right-wing parties and the left wing parties. This is quite unusual considering that
both Aylwin and Frei were from the Christian Democratic Party. Nevertheless, Frei’s presidential
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approval ratings were far lower than Aylwin’s.
The levels of partisanship of both left and right-wing parties did not substantially decrease until
the end of Ricardo Lagos government in 2006. In fact, both right and left-wing partisans were
almost at their historical highest levels of partisanship in October of 2005. While the left-wing
parties achieved their highest levels of partisanship since the restoration of democracy then
(24.8%), the right-wing parties reached 22.7%, their second highest recorded scored in this period.
After 2006, the levels of partisanship start declining at a similar pace on both sides of the political
spectrum. At their lowest point, the levels of partisanship in the right were 3.8%, while in the left
5.6%. Finally, the Christian Democratic party peaked its record low level of partisanship in
October 2018, where 2.1% of the respondents identified themselves with the party.
Research in Chile: Present explanations of the decline
As indicated before, I argue that the contemporary Chilean political system is organized around
the divisions inherited from the authoritarian period (1973-1990). Democracy was re-established
by the national plebiscite of 1988, which structured the country’s political parties around two
coalitions determined by the acceptance or rejection of the previous military regime Valenzuela
and Scully (1997); Torcal and Mainwaring (2003). The scope and reach of these divisions are at
the center of the discussion regarding the nature of the party systems in Chile.
On one hand, Torcal and Mainwaring 2003 argue that the authoritarian experience deeply divided
the Chilean society, leading to a persistent realignment in the party system. From this
standpoint, the military dictatorship defined essential aspects of the political system, such as
political identities and political preferences that replaced the longstanding class and religion
cleavages which formerly characterized the previously highly structured party system in Chile.
The discontinuity between the divisions prior to the military regime and the post-authoritarian
landscape can be illustrated by the shift from a three thirds system, with a distinct left, center
and right political forces, to a two-part system with one center-left and a right-wing coalition.
That is to say, the tripartite character of the Chilean political system, characterized by three
distinct competitive political forces was replaced by a bipolar system that expressed the divisions
between those who supported and those who opposed the military dictatorship. Thus, the
national plebiscite of 1988 played a leading role in shaping this political environment Tironi and
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Agüero (1999); Tironi et al. (2001).
On the other hand, other research shows skepticism regarding the extent to which this new
cleavage transformed Chilean political identities. Valenzuela and Scully 1997 show a remarkable
continuity in the voting patterns before and after the military dictatorship. In other words,
according to the authors, the electoral outcomes prior to the authoritarian regime are a strong
predictor of electoral outcomes in the years that followed the democratic restoration. These
findings lead them to claim that historical traditional class and religious divisions are still shaping
the Chilean political identities and preferences. From this perspective, traditional cleavages are
deeply rooted into civil society, generating collective memories of past political divisions. Even
though there is a consensus regarding the post-Pinochet structure of the political system, namely,
that party alliances within the political system are shaped by the authoritarian Pinochet period,
“it is unlikely that a new cleavage has emerged with sufficient force to reorganize the basic
contours of the Chilean Political landscape” Scully (1995).
Even though there is no consensus on the extent of the change that the dictatorship period
inflicted on the Chilean political landscape, there is more agreement that the
authoritarian/democratic divide should diminish over time Valenzuela and Scully (1997); Torcal
and Mainwaring (2003); Luna and Mardones (2010); Luna and Altman (2011). Torcal and
Mainwaring 2003 suggest three mechanisms through which this divide should fade over time:
generational replacement, fading memories of the authoritarian experience as time goes by, and
efforts by the right-wing parties to distance themselves from the military dictatorship.
Others agree with the general argument of a declining divide, if not the specific mechanisms. For
example, Luna and Altman agree with Torcal and Mainwaring on the fact that the salience of the
authoritarian/democratic cleavage should decline over time. According to their view, although
the authoritarian/democratic divide is essential in order to understand the nature of the
post-authoritarian Chilean political landscape, the salience of this cleavage should decline over
time. Moreover, the stability of the two-coalition system has been artificially sustained by the
nature of the legislative electoral rules inherited from the military dictatorship which does not
provide incentives for political renewal and strongly favors the two bigger coalitions.
In particular, the combination of binominal electoral districts with electoral rules which allow
party elites to handpick candidates on party lists, in effect in most cases determines who will get
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elected to Congress, while providing artificial safeguards to the party system status quo Luna and
Mardones (2010); Luna and Altman (2011). Likewise, mandatory voting rules in combination
with voluntary registration generated high levels of non-registration among the youth, which
contributed to the lack of incentives for political renewal. From this perspective, the
democratic-authoritarian divide should also fade over time, both as generational replacement
marches on and through changes in the electoral rules, which were enacted in the years 2005 and
2012.
In similar fashion, Valenzuela and Scully 1997 contend that, as the center left coalition was
created as an attempt to defeat Pinochet in the national referendum of 1988, winning the
presidency and pressing for the full restoration of the democratic institutions, the cleavage
between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime will lose its strength as time goes
by. What these arguments all share is a similar view that generational replacement over time is a
likely main driver of decline in the democratic/authoritarian cleavage.
However, the most comprehensive statistical analysis conducted in Chile to date, which employs
an age-period-cohort analysis of survey data from 1994 to 2014, finds that the decline in
partisanship is largely not driven by generational replacement. Instead, it appears to be driven
more by period effects Bargsted and Maldonado (2018). This analysis finds that the decline in
partisanship has affected all age groups simultaneously. This means that, if the
authoritarian/democratic divide is diminishing over time, this decline is not a consequence of the
incorporation of new younger voters who were not socialized during the authoritarian period.
Rather, as a consequence of some set of circumstances that took place during the democratic era
after the military rule.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
The Chilean post-authoritarian political landscape challenges two important competing
explanations of party identification in the literature. On one hand, perspectives that portray the
ties between political parties and voters as instrumental would predict an increase, or at least
stability, in the levels of party identification driven by the outstanding economic and political
performance of the country over the 1990-2018 period. On the other, given that existing theories
that emphasize political identification as a form of identity claim that partisanship should be
fairly stable over time, the sharp decrease in the levels of partisanship among the Chilean
population are inconsistent with that type of explanation, especially since they are not driven
primarily by generational replacement.
My general claim is that the impressive decrease in party identification experienced in
post-authoritarian Chile can be largely explained by the existence of unstable identity based ties
between the political parties and the mass public, a possibility that has been largely overlooked in
the existing literature on partisanship in the United States ?cf.¿green1994, green2002, huddy2015,
kalin2018.
Much of the U.S. politics based literature on partisanship claims that levels of partisanship are
stable because partisan attachments are in fact a particular form of social identity. Partisan
identification forms in early adulthood, and is an enduring feature of self-conception Green et al.
(2002). Given the stability of the United States political system, and the enduring divisions that
had characterized this particular political landscape, this literature has neglected the fact that
partisanship can be highly dependent on party agency.
I argue that political identities must be constantly reinforced by political actors in order to be
stable. Political identities are driven by conflict, dissent, controversy and opposition, a fact that
has been strongly underlined by cleavage theory Lipset and Rokkan (1967)8. These oppositions
8““Party” has throughout the History of Western government stood for division, conflict, opposition within a body
politie. “Party” is etymologically derived from “part” and since it first appeared in political discourse int the late
Middle Ages has always retained this reference to one set of elements in competition or in controversy with another
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that organize party systems are key elements of political identities. Accordingly, a necessary
condition of stable partisan identities is the presence of an on-going stable conflict, which is able
to constantly fuel those identities within the political system.
The Chilean post-authoritarian political landscape is an example of how political agency can
dissolve newly formed partisan identities through the disintegration of the main conflict that
articulated the party system. In particular, I claim that the active efforts from the right-wing
parties to distance themselves from the military dictatorship and the figure of the dictator
Augusto Pinochet, ultimately undermined the key link between political parties and citizens.
Since partisanship and political preferences were to a large extent driven by the divisions between
supporters of democracy and those nostalgic for the authoritarian period, once the right-wing
parties actively managed to distance themselves from their authoritarian identity, the main force
driving partisanship ceased to exist. One of the main consequences of this effort is the steady
decrease and aggregate low levels of partisanship in contemporary Chile perceived at least since
the beginning of the year 2006.
The Authoritarian-Democratic Divide in the early 1990s
The national plebiscite of 1988 played an essential role in the configuration of the Chilean
post-authoritarian political landscape Valenzuela and Scully (1997); Tironi and Agüero (1999);
Tironi et al. (2001); Torcal and Mainwaring (2003); Toro Maureira (2008); Tironi (2010). It was
the actual materialization of the division of the country in two opposite poles: political
authoritarianism and market oriented economic neo-liberalism on one side, and political
democracy and state-oriented economy on the other Tironi (2010). The political authoritarian
and neo-liberal economic perspective was represented in the option “Si” (Yes) which granted
another 8 years to the rule of General Augusto Pinochet, while the political democracy and
state-oriented economy pole was represented in the option “No” (No), which favored the end of
the authoritarian period Tironi and Agüero (1999).
The relevance of this opposition is due to the fact that the authoritarian period constituted a
dramatic collective experience for a whole generation. An important proportion of the electorate
set of elements within some unified whole” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 3).
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in the early democratic years of the nineties built their political identities during that time Tironi
and Agüero (1999).
There is compelling evidence that supports the idea that the authoritarian/democratic divide was
a powerful force driving political identities and political choices in the early post-authoritarian
Chilean political landscape.
For example, Huneeus and Maldonado 2003 claim that the political legacies of the military
dictatorship divided the country between supporters of democracy and those nostalgic for the
authoritarian past. Both notions of democracy and autocracy were influenced by the legacy of the
dictatorship and coalitions that shaped the Chilean political arena. Torcal and Mainwaring 2003
show that support of democracy and evaluations of the Pinochet regime are the strongest
predictors of both party identification and vote choice during the 90s, over and above left-right
economic orientation and type of employment which organized the party system previous to the
1973 coup d’état. Likewise, Tironi et al., show that the democratic/authoritarian divide is a
strong predictor of vote choice in the 2000 Chilean presidential election. Finally, Bargsted and
Somma 2016 argue that support for authoritarian forms of government has a strong effect on
ideological attitudes among Chileans, especially in the 90s.
Data from the early 1990s provided by the Center of Public Studies (CEP) support these
arguments. Figures 4 and 5 show how party identification and ideological preferences are strongly
shaped by opinion towards the military regime.
Figure 4 shows that Chileans with unfavorable opinions towards the military dictatorship are far
more likely to identify themselves with left-wing parties (PS-PRSD-PPD) and the Christian
Democratic Party (DC). In turn, right wing partisans (UDI + RN) are mainly constituted by
citizens with favorable opinions towards the Pinochet regime.
Figure 5 shows strong differences concerning ideological preferences between supporters and
opponents of the military regime. People that have unfavorable opinions towards Pinochet
constitute more than 80% of the left-wing partisans. On the contrary, citizens that show a
positive perception of the military regime are way more likely to identify themselves with right
wing preferences.
Opinions towards Augusto Pinochet were not only highly predictive of partisan identification and
political preferences during this period, but they also shaped the way in which citizens evaluate
18
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contemporary political events.
Figures 6 and 7 show how the perceptions of the opinions toward the Pinochet regime are related
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to the perception of the economy and the incumbent 9 In both cases, citizens with favorable
opinions toward Pinochet tend to have a more critical perspective. This is especially relevant in
9At that time the President was Patricio Aylwin from the center-left coalition.
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the case of presidential approval, where the difference is quite striking, of more than 20% points.
Institutionalization and Consolidation of the Divide
These strong differences between supporters of democracy and those supportive of the prior
authoritarian regime were institutionalized through at least four mechanisms. First, the plebiscite
shaped the two main coalitions that disputed power within the new democratic context: the
Concertation coalition grouped the main figures and parties that advocated for the return of the
democracy, while the Alliance coalition (latter Go Chile10) cluster the supporters of the military
regime. Second, the Binominal System, which established the election of two candidates per
congressional district, generated strong incentives for the formation and preservation of those two
coalitions. On one side, it was designed to grant an advantage to the second largest coalition
giving it the same number of representatives than the biggest one in each district11. Thus,
combined with initial gerrymandering by the military government, this helped to systematically
over-represent the parties of the Alliance coalition Navia and Rojas (2005); Carey (2006). On the
other, giving that only two representatives are elected in each congressional district, it imposed
high entry barriers for candidacies outside the two biggest coalition, effectively excluding parties
to the left of the Concetation. Consequently, this electoral framework provided constitutional
safeguards for the continuity of the political landscape composed of a two moderate coalition
party system Luna and Mardones (2010); Luna and Altman (2011). Third, the democratic pole
was also reinforced by the continuous efforts of the Concertation coalition to overhaul the
institutional framework inherited from the authoritarian period, while the authoritarian pole was
reinforced by the struggles of the right-wing opposition to maintain it12. Finally, political actors,
especially the ones in the winning coalition Concertation, actively reinforced the
authoritarian-democratic divide as an electoral strategy Tironi and Agüero (1999).
10Chile Vamos.
11According to the Binominal System, two representatives must be elected in every district. The two seats are
distributed according to the d’Hondt method. Accordingly, if one of the coalitions get more than two thirds of the
votes, it takes both seats.
12Among many other institutional features, the 1980 constitutions established two type of non-elected senators:
senators who had life tenure and designated senators. Augusto Pinochet was a life tenured senator. The establishment
of these two types of senators was one of the most contentious features of the 1980 constitution and a source of
continuous political tension during the 1990s and early 2000s.
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At the end of the 1990s, everything pointed towards a continuing crystallization of the division
between supporters and opponents of the military dictatorship. The two coalitions that competed
in the national plebiscite of 1988 were the main actors in the political sphere. Likewise, Augusto
Pinochet was suddenly arrested in England in 1998, indicted for human rights violations. The
indictment and arrest bolstered the intensity and salience of the conflicts around the authoritarian
period. Finally, the success of the Concertation coalition in all the major elections provided good
reasons to actively pursue the continuity of the political status quo Tironi and Agüero (1999).
The Decline
The first clear signs of decline in the authoritarian-democratic divide orienting the party system
can be traced to the 2000 presidential election campaign between socialist candidate Ricardo
Lagos and Joaqúın Lav́ın, a right-wing politician who was an active collaborator of the Pinochet
regime. This was the first election in which a right-wing presidential candidate actually posed a
threat to the ruling Concertación coalition.
Since the beginning of the 2000 presidential election campaign, the right-wing coalition Alliance
changed their electoral strategy, marking the beginning of the erosion of the
authoritarian-democratic cleavage. The Joaqúın Lav́ın 2000 campaign led that change, with a
political campaign oriented to “do things”, and that highlighted the virtues of change Tironi
(2010). According to Tironi et al. 2001, the 2000 presidential election revealed some key changes
within the right-wing coalition. It was the first campaign by the rightist coalition that took
distance from Pinochet, advocated for the resolution of pending issues regarding the infringement
of human rights during the military dictatorship, and was open to reform some non-democratic
features of the 1980 Pinochet-era constitution.
Figure 8 shows how successful this strategy was. Joaqúın Lavin almost doubled the number of
votes and percentage obtained by the candidate that precede him within his coalition in 1993,
Arturo Alessandri. This new platform, designed to give the right-wing electoral success,
distancing itself from the ideological debate and the figures from the military dictatorship Aubry
and Dockendorff (2014), not only consistently improved the right-wing electoral performance in
the subsequent elections, but also gave them the presidency in the year 2010. That year Sebastián
Piñera, a right-wing politician and businessman from the center-right coalition, defeated the
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ex-president Eduardo Frei from the until that moment ruling center-left coalition Concertation.
An important consequence of this first shift in power since the restoration of democracy13 was the
dismantling of Concertation coalition. That year, the coalition that successfully defeated Augusto
Pinochet in the national plebiscite of 1988 and ruled the country for twenty continuous years
ended.
Political Legacies and Party Identification
The decrease of the salience of the post-Pinochet cleavage between supporters and opponents of
the military dictatorship is a key element in understanding the impressive decrease in partisan
identification over the last thirty years. This cleavage has played a key role shaping the linkages
between political parties and citizens. Hence, as the conflict fades over time, the partisan links
that were initially created around this divide will proportionally erode.
The national plebiscite of 1988 not only shaped the post-authoritarian political landscape,
likewise, it provided a founding moment that forged the ties between the Chilean citizenry and its
political parties. It was the first time Chileans voted in eight years and the first election with
minimal democratic guarantees since the 1972 election Toro Maureira (2008). The importance of
this founding moment should not be understated. As such, the relation between political parties
13Concertation ruled Chile for four consecutive terms: Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei (1994-2000),
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010).
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and citizens not only was re-established at that moment, but also provided the primary way in
which ties between political parties and the citizens were forged. With democracy restored, the
oppositions inherited from the authoritarian past provided both right and left-wing parties with a
narrative that linked them with the public. On the right, this was as defenders of the successes of
the military dictatorship, especially the economic improvements that resulted from the economic
reforms lead by the “Chicago boys”14 in the eighties Lav́ın (1987). On the left, the narrative was
as advocates of democracy, human rights and an inclusive way of development, with an accent on
redistribution Tironi (1988). Therefore, the linkages between political parties and citizens in the
Chilean post-authoritarian context were primarily driven by the identities and oppositions that
marked the transition to democracy.
The nature of these linkages is precisely what explains the abrupt decrease in party identification
in the last thirty years. The active efforts of the right-wing parties to distance themselves from
the authoritarian period not only boosted the right-wing parties’ electoral performance, but also
actively contributed to the dissolution of the main opposition that fueled the ties between citizens
and political parties.
As I argued before, political identities must be constantly reinforced by political actors in order to
be stable. Political identities are driven by conflict, dissent, controversy and opposition. These
oppositions that organize party systems are key elements of political identities. Accordingly, a




My main claim is that the decline in the levels of partisanship is a consequence of the dissolution
of the democratic/authoritarian cleavage. Originally, partisanship was fueled by the divide
between supporters of democracy and those supportive of the prior authoritarian regime.
Accordingly, my main expectation is that once the parties of the right abandoned their explicit
support for the past authoritarian period, we should see a decline in partisanship by both
14A group of Chilean economists that studied in the University of Chicago under the supervision of Milton Friedman.
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supporters of the Pinochet regime and supporters of democracy.
Hypothesis 1: The probability of being a partisan among both authoritarians and democrats
should decline over time.
The dissolution of the authoritarian/democratic cleavage was mainly driven by efforts from right
wing parties to distance themselves from the military dictatorship. Accordingly, I expect that the
decrease on partisan identification to by higher among authoritarians than democrats.
Hypothesis 2: The rate of decrease on partisan identification should be higher within
authoritarians compared to democrats and indifferent populations.
Furthermore, since partisanship was originally fueled by the division between supporters and
opponents of the authoritarian regime, I expect the rate of decline in levels of partisanship to be
higher within the democratic and authoritarian populations compared to the rest.
Hypothesis 3: The rate of decline in partisanship levels should be higher among democrats and
authoritarians compared to the rest of the population.
Alternative Hypotheses
Based on other theoretical arguments, several alternative hypotheses can be advanced to explain
the decline in partisanship in contemporary Chile. First, scholars have claimed that ideological
convergence and brand dissolution can lead to a decline of partisanship Lupu (2013, 2016).
Previous research in Chile, based on data from the Manifesto Project, argue that there is growing
programmatic convergence between the center-left and right coalitions, which, in turn, has
contributed to decrease the levels of partisanship among the Chilean population. According to
this view, the ideological convergence is due to programmatic moderation of the right-wing
parties. It took place from the beginning of the 2000s, and the highest level of programmatic
moderation was reached in the 2013 presidential election Madariaga and Rovira Kaltwasser
(2019); Rovira Kaltwasser (2019).
Second, from an instrumental perspective on partisanship it could be claimed that despite the
country’s strong macroeconomic performance, perception of this performance might have
declined. Accordingly, the downturn in partisanship can be a product of a decline in voters’
perceptions of the country’s economic performance and control of corruption.
Closely related with economic performance, inequality in Chile has been particularly stubborn.
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Inequality has been characterized as one of the main social problems in the country Luna and
Mardones (2010). According to this perspective, the decline of partisanship can be understood as
a consequence of the incapacity of the political system to solve the inequality problem, regardless
of the economic growth.
These three hypotheses can be formalized in the following way:
Alternative Hypothesis 1: Voters perceive that the Chilean political parties have experienced
significant ideological convergence over the post-authoritarian period, leading to a decrease in the
overall levels of partisanship in the mass public.
Alternative Hypothesis 2: Voters perceive that the performance of political elites has decreased
over the post-authoritarian period, leading to a decrease in the level of partisanship among the
citizenry.
Alternative Hypothesis 3: Voters evaluation of the way in which the political elites are dealing
with inequality has decreased over the post-authoritarian period, leading to a decrease in the
overall levels of partisanship in the mass public.
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DATA, VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND METHODS
Data and Variable Operationalization
In order to test both my hypotheses and the alternative ones, the analysis employs the Diego
Portales University National Survey15, a nationally representative survey that was conducted in
Chile between the years 2005 and 201516.
In order to measure the dependent variable, Party Identification, I use the following question:
“with which one of the following political parties do you identify or sympathize more?”17. The
question presents an exhaustive list of political parties, which was updated as new political
parties were founded and old ones were dissolved. Likewise, the question contains a residual
category (i.e “other”) in case the respondent’s option is not included. For the first set of models,
this question was coded as 1 if the respondent indicated a preference for any political party and 0
otherwise. For the second set, the variable was coded with four different values: 1) Concertation,
which grouped all the parties that belong historically to that political coalition, 2) Alliance, which
grouped all the right wing parties that formed part of that coalition 3) Other: for the residual
parties, and finally, 4) None: for those citizens that claimed none preference.
I use regime preferences in order to measure the division between supporters and critics of the
military dictatorship. The question asks “Which of the following statements do you agree with
most?” and has three alternatives: “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”,
“In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one” and
“To people like me, it doesn’t matter whether we have a democratic government or a
non-democratic government”. This allow us to divide the respondents into three groups:
supporters of democracy, supporters of authoritarianism and undecided. This strategy has been
15Encuesta Nacional Universidad Diego Portales.
16I chose that survey over CEP, which covers a wider period of time, because CEP survey does not has a cross
survey consistent predictor of authoritarian and democratic attitudes.
17Ahora, de los siguientes partidos poĺıticos que se presentan en esta tarjeta, ¿con cuál de ellos se identifica más o
simpatiza más Ud.?
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used previously in Chile Tironi and Agüero (1999); Tironi et al. (2001); Torcal and Mainwaring
(2003); Bargsted and Somma (2016); Valenzuela et al. (2018).
I tested several model specifications for the age variable. Table 4 in the appendix shows the
model fit for each one of these specifications, I used model 3 of table 1 (the full model) to
compare them. I tested seven different specifications: age, age squared, year of birth, 5 years
cohorts, 10 years cohorts, a voted in the plebiscite dummy18, and a voted in the plebiscite dummy
plus age. There is no substantial difference between any of these specifications. Following
Bargsted and Maldonado, I decided to use 5 years cohorts for the models.
Following Córdova I use a measure of relative wealth using household asset indicators as an
income indicator. Given that income based measures suffer from both under and over reporting,
and high non-response rates19, households assets present a more precise measure of well-being for
a larger proportion of respondents Córdova (2009). More details on how the measure was
constructed are provided in the appendix, section .
Likewise, the models include several other control variables such as gender, education, religion
and region. Although a rural/urban dummy would have been better suited for these estimations,
I use region because there is no urban/rural variable available in the dataframe.
In order to test the alternative hypotheses, I use two different sources. For alternative hypothesis
1, I use both the Latin American Parliamentary Elite Surveys (PELA) and the Diego Portales
National Survey. PELA surveys consist of representative samples of democratically elected
legislators of eighteen Latin American countries. The survey measures attitudes and opinions of
parliamentarians and it is available in Chile since the second legislative period after the return of
democracy. Accordingly, it covers a 25 years period, from 1993 to 2018, in which legislators were
interviewed once for each one of the legislative periods. PELA asks their respondents to place
themselves on a 10 left-right point scale. This question allows me to evaluate to what extent there
is self-identified ideological convergence across the parliamentary elites in Chile.
I also estimate the extent to which there is a perceived ideological convergence of the political
elites among the general population. The Diego Portales National Surveys include a set of
questions where they ask the interviewees to place the political parties and two major political
18Individuals that were 18 years old the year the plebiscite took place.
19In the UDP survey, non-response rates for this question vary from 13.7% to 43.8% depending on the year.
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coalitions on a 10 point left-right point scale. However, this set of questions was only asked
between 2006 and 2010, which means I can estimate the extent of perceived ideological
convergence among political elites only for this four-year period.
In order to test alternative hypothesis 2, I use questions about perception of the state of the
economy and corruption. The Diego Portales National Surveys include the perception of the
economy question from 2005 to 2015, while the perception of corruption question is included from
2006 to 2013.
Finally, to test alternative hypothesis 3, I use two sources of data. First, using data from the
World Developing Indicators I evaluate the extent to which inequality has decreased since the end
of the dictatorship in 1990. Second, using data from the Diego Portales National Survey, I use the
evaluation of the government regarding inequality in order to test if perceptions of the way in
which inequality has been handled are related to the decrease in partisanship.
Methods
The main results are based on two set of models. The first set of models are logistic regression
models with party identification coded as a binary variable. The dependent variable is coded as 1
if the respondents identify themselves with a political party and 0 otherwise. The first model
includes all predictors but regime preferences, the second one includes regime preferences and the
third one includes an interaction between year and regime preferences. The three models include
region fixed effects as one of the control variables. To illustrate the main findings of this set of
models, I estimated predicted probabilities bases on the third of these models.
The second set of models is a single estimation of model three but in the context of multinomial
logistic regression. In this case, the dependent variable is coded with four values noted above.
Given that the categories of interest are mainly Concertation and Alliance, figure 10 shows the
predicted probabilities only for these values on the dependent variable.
For the alternative hypothesis 1, figure 11 shows the average self-placement of Chilean
parliamentary elites in the 10-point left-right scale for each one of the main political parties and
political coalitions. Figure 12 shows the average placement of the political elites by the general
population sample. Accordingly, figure 11 allows me to estimate the extent to which
parliamentary elites are ideologically converging and figure 12 allows me to estimate the extent to
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which the general population perceives ideological convergence among the political elites.
For alternative hypothesis 2, I use data regarding perceptions of the economy and corruption in
order to evaluate to what extent the decrease in partisanship can be explained by perceptions of
declining economic and political performance in the country that can be blamed on the political
elites.
Finally, to evaluate alternative hypothesis 3 I use data regarding objective levels of inequality and
perceived levels of government performance regarding inequality. This data allows me to evaluate
the extent to which the decrease in partisanship is related to the way in which income is




Table 1 shows the results of the logistic regression models. The first model includes all predictors
but regime preferences, the second one includes regime preferences and the third one includes an
interaction term between year and regime preferences20.
Model 2 shows there are statistically significant differences between authoritarians and
democratic respondents, compared to those who are undecided between the two. Compared to
the undecided, the levels of party identification are higher among democrats and authoritarians.
Likewise, the model fit increases substantially once regime preferences are included in the
estimation. The McFadden R2 increases from .07 to .54 once regime preferences are included,
making this variable by far the most important predictor of the model.
Model 3 includes an interaction term between regime preferences and year. Figure 9 shows a
graphical representation of those effects. In the year 2005, the levels of partisanship of both
democrats and authoritarians were very high. According to the estimations presented in figure 9,
the probability of identifying with a political party for democrats was of 48%, while for
authoritarians it was 54%. Although party identification was higher among authoritarians in
2005, partisanship within this group declined at a much faster rate than for democrats. By the
year 2009, compared to authoritarians, democrats presented a greater probability of identifying
with a political party. However, both of these groups experience a rapid decline in their levels of
partisanship. By the year 2013, the differences in levels of party identification between undecideds
and authoritarians is no longer statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. Even though in
2015 the differences in partisanship between democrats and undecideds is still statistically
significant, the decrease in the levels of partisanship among democrats is quite striking. By 2015,
20A similar set of models is presented in the appendix, table 5. The models in the appendix include perception of
economic performance. The variable was dropped for the analysis presented in table 1 because the question was not
asked in 2012.
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the probability of identifying with a political party for democrats is only 25%, more than 20
percentage points lower than in 2005.
These findings are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 3, both that there is a decline in the
predicted probability of identifying as a partisan, and that this decrease is much sharper than for
the rest of the population, which maintains constant levels of partisanship throughout the period.
The sharper decrease among the authoritarian population is consistent with the fact that, during
that period, the right-wing parties actively worked to distance themselves from the military
dictatorship. As the right-wing parties distanced themselves from the figure of Augusto Pinochet,
they weakened the link that tied them to key sectors of the public. Even though, this electoral
strategy improved the electoral success of the right, finally leading to the election of Sebastián
Piñera in the 2010 election, these findings suggest that, at the same time, it weakened the ties
between the right-wing parties and their core supporters.
As hypothesized earlier, the ties of the center and left-wing parties of the Concertation to their
core supporters were also harmed as a result of the distancing actions of the right-wing parties.
What most linked the left and center political parties with their core constituency was the
opposition to the military regime. Once the right-wing parties distanced themselves from the
dictatorship, the narrative of the opposition ceased to make sense to the mass public.
Accordingly, we can see that the democratic supporters follow a similar trajectory to that of the
authoritarians, though at a more gradual pace. All these findings provide strong support for
hypothesis 1, 2 and 3.
Table 2 presents the results of the multinomial regression logistic models21. The base category for
the estimation of these models is identification with the Alliance coalition. Given that the results
of multinomial regression models are quite difficult to interpret without a graphical representation,
figure 10 summarize the main findings regarding the variables of interest. Table 2 and figure 10
provide a more detailed portrait of the decreasing levels of partisanship during the period under
study. According to the expectations, initially, Concertation partisans were mainly composed by
individuals who stated that democracy is the best form of government. On the contrary, in 2005
21A similar set of models is presented in the appendix, table 6. The models in the appendix include perception of
economic performance. The variable was dropped for the analysis presented in table 2 because the question was not
asked in 2012.
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the core supporters of the right-wing coalitions were individuals who stated that an authoritarian
government can be preferable to a democratic one. In other words, in the year 2005, right and
center left-wing partisans were sorted according to their views regarding the military dictatorship.
Figure 10 also shows that over time the levels of partisanship among both coalitions weakened as
a consequence of the migration of their core constituents towards non-partisan preferences.
Among the right-wing partisans, the levels of partisanship decrease primarily as a consequence of
the migration of those supportive of the previous authoritarian regime towards non-partisan
preference. A similar movement can be appreciated among center-left partisans. Supporters of
democracy decrease their levels of party identification with the Concertation coalition over time.
Finally, the relationship between party identification and the control variables is consistent across
the three models in table 1. With respect to gender, males tend to have higher levels of party
identification than females. Levels of partisanship are higher among the more educated and
wealthy population. Catholics tend to have higher levels of party identification than individuals
that do not identify with a religion. Likewise, people that perceive that the economy is doing
better tend to have higher levels of identification than those ones who feel that it is going worse
or the same.
While year has a significant negative effect on partisanship, cohort does not22. As years go by, the
model predicts that the levels of partisanship should decline for the period studied. These
findings are consistent with Bargsted and Maldonado 2018 who claim that partisanship is mainly
decreasing through period effect.
Alternative Explanations
Ideological Convergence
An alternative hypothesis is that the main cause for the decline in partisanship among the
Chilean population is ideological convergence among the party elites Madariaga and
Rovira Kaltwasser (2019); Rovira Kaltwasser (2019).
However, data from the PELA surveys of parliamentary elites shows no signs of ideological
convergence among political elites between 1993 and 2014. Figure 11 show the average
22Table 4 shows the difference in the estimations of the models using different age specifications. There are no
substantial differences between the models
33




Female (ref. Male) −0.209∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Education 0.229∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Income 0.542∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.104) (0.104)
Evangelical (ref. Catholic) −0.020 −0.003 −0.008
(0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
Other (ref. Catholic) −0.051 −0.034 −0.019
(0.121) (0.122) (0.122)
None (ref. Catholic) −0.153∗∗ −0.144∗∗ −0.147∗∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
Cohort (5 years) −0.010 −0.005 −0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year (Centered at 2005) −0.126∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.007) (0.008) (0.021)
Authoritarian (ref. Undecided) 0.803∗∗∗ 1.725∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.178)






Intercept −1.205∗∗∗ −1.876∗∗∗ −2.446∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.206) (0.241)
Region Fix Effects X X X
Observations 7, 693 7, 693 7, 693
McFadden R2 0.067 0.535 0.538
Log Likelihood -4,544.183 -4,470.874 -4,450.061
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,130.366 8,987.749 8,950.123
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2: Multinomial Regression Model
Party Identification (ref. None)
Alliance Concertation Other
(1) (2) (3)
Female (ref. Male) −0.135∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗
(0.081) (0.063) (0.123)
Education 0.354∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.137
(0.063) (0.049) (0.097)
Income 1.100∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗ −0.023
(0.165) (0.127) (0.240)
Evangelical (ref. Catholic) −0.033 −0.001 0.048
(0.125) (0.094) (0.189)
Other (ref. Catholic) −0.008 0.020 −0.149
(0.186) (0.148) (0.322)
None (ref. Catholic) −0.384∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.092) (0.142)
Cohort (5 years) −0.041∗∗∗ −0.016 0.132∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.021)
Year (Centered at 2005) −0.057∗ 0.017 −0.004
(0.032) (0.030) (0.047)
Authoritarian (ref. Undecided) 1.850∗∗∗ 1.724∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗
(0.245) (0.254) (0.418)
Democratic(ref. Undecided) 0.608∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗ 1.151∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.222) (0.352)
Authoritarian*Year −0.144∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.065)
Democratic*Year −0.027 −0.137∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗
(0.035) (0.032) (0.051)
Intercept −3.796∗∗∗ −3.106∗∗∗ −4.698∗∗∗
(0.373) (0.321) (0.537)
Region Fix Effects X X X
Observations 7, 693
McFadden R2 0.535
Log Likelihood −6, 616.618
Akaike Inf. Crit. 13, 383.24
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Source: Diego Portales University National Survey 2005-2015
95% Confidence intervals estimated using Monte Carlo Simulation.
self-placement of legislators for each one of the parliamentary periods for each party and political
coalition. Plot 11.a evaluates the extent to which political parties have ideologically converged
over the 1993-2014 period. The average ideological placement of left-wing parliamentarians (PPD,
PRSD and PS) ranges between 2 and 4 for the whole period. The center-left political party DC
ranges between 4 and 5. Parliamentarians of the two right-wing political parties, UDI and RN,
place themselves on average between 6 and 8 from 1993 to 2014.
The same is true at the level of political coalitions. Representatives of the Concertation coalition
place themselves on average between 4 and 3.5 for the whole period analyzed. Delegates from the
right-wing coalition Alliance place themselves on average between 6.5 and 7.5. There are some
weak signs of ideological divergence in the last two congressional periods (2006-2014).
Although there are no signs of ideological convergence among the parliamentary elites, an
alternative argument would be that it is perception of ideological convergence among the public
that is driving the decline in partisanship in Chile.
However, figure 12 shows there is no signs of perception of ideological convergence of parties or
coalitions among the mass public. Right political parties, RN and UDI are placed on average
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Source: Diego Portales University National Survey 2005-2015
95% Confidence intervals estimated using Monte Carlo Simulation.
between 9 and 7 for the whole period where data is available. The same is true for left wing
political parties and center left political parties. At the levels of coalitions, there is an impressive
consistency between the self-placement of representatives and the one the mass public attributes
to their parties. The ideological distance between Concertation and Alliance appears larger when
citizens place parties than in the case of parliamentarians placing themselves.
Therefore, figures 11 and 12 clearly show that there is no ideological convergence among political
parties or coalitions in contemporary Chile. These findings suggest that the downturn in
partisanship is not being be driven by ideological convergence or perceptions of ideological
convergence among citizens. Consequently, alternative hypothesis 1 is rejected.
Economic Performance and Corruption
The decrease in partisanship in Chile might be a consequence of increasing levels of discomfort
among the citizens towards the performance of the political leaders or incumbent president.
Although the economic performance and corruption standards in the country are well above the
mean of the region, it is still possible that the performance of the economy and in corruption does
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Figure 11: Ideological Self-Placement among Parliamentary Elites
(a) Political Parties (b) Political Coalitions
Source: Proyecto de Elites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas (PELA), Universidad de Salamanca.
not meet the expectations among the public.
Figure 13 shows the fluctuation of perception of economy and corruption for the period. The
perception of the economy stood relatively stable until 2013, where it suddenly drops. This drop
cannot explain the decrease of party identification previous to 2013. Conversely, most of the
citizens claim that the economy is not doing better or worse.
In terms of perception of corruption, figure 13 shows an important decrease in the levels of
perceived corruption between 2008 and 2010. Likewise, most of the Chilean population believes
that the corruption has remained at the same levels throughout the period.
Accordingly, neither perception of corruption nor perception of the economy can be the major
explanations for the decrease in partisan identification in Chile. Therefore, alternative hypothesis
2 is rejected.
Inequality
Panel a of figure 14 shows the Worl Bank estimation of the Gini index in Chile from 1990 to 2018.
Although the levels of inequality were quite steady from 1990 to the year 2000, since the Ricardo
Lagos administration (2000-2006), the levels of inequality has been decreasing at a somewhat
steady rate. While from 1990 to 1998 the Gini index decreased from .572 to .555, from the year
2000 to 2006, it decreased from .528 to .473. By the year 2018, Chile scored .444, more than 10
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Figure 12: Ideological Placement of Political Parties
(a) Political Parties (b) Political Coalitions
Source: Diego Portales University National Survey 2005-2015
points less than 30 years ago.
Panel b of figure 14 shows the perceived performance of the incumbent regime with respect to
inequality23. Citizens evaluations of government performance regarding inequality are quite low
for the whole period where there is available data. Only during Bachelet’s administration
(2006-2010), a government was evaluated with a grade higher than 4. The evaluations of the
governments with respect to inequality follow a similar trajectory than the decrease in inequality.
Likewise, the models presented in table 7 and 8 show that evaluations of government performance
with respect to inequality are positively correlated with partisanship. Accordingly, perceptions of
government performance with respect to inequality seem to also be playing a role in the decrease
of partisan attachments in contemporary Chile.
23In Chile, school grades range from 1 to 7. A course is failed with a grade lower than 4.
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Figure 13: Perception of the Economy and Corruption
(a) Economy (b) Corruption
Source: Diego Portales University National Survey 2005-2015
Figure 14: Inequality Indicator and Perceptions
(a) Gini Index (b) Government Evaluation: Inequality
Source: World Development Indicators and Diego Portales University National Survey 2005-2015
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The role of inequality as a key driver of the decline has two limitations. First, it does not explain
why there is a decline on the levels of right-wing partisanship before the year 2010. If the way the
government is handling inequality is driving the decline, how is it possible that evaluations of the
left-wing incumbent parties were causing a decline of partisanship of the right wing parties?
Second, although the performance evaluation of the government seems to be correlated with the
decrease of partisanship, the performance evaluations were quite steady during both Michelle
Bachelet’s (2006-2010) and Sebastián Piñera’s evaluation (2010-2014). While the average grade




I have argued that a critical factor in the decline in partisanship in contemporary Chile over the
year 2005 to 2015 period is the dissolution of the main political division between supporters and
critics of the military regime. In the year 2005, party identification was strongly associated with
the opinions Chileans had with respect to the military dictatorship that took place from 1973 to
1989. People that had strong democratic convictions was identified with the left-wing coalition
Concertation, while people that evaluated positively the military dictatorship identified with the
right-wing coalition Alliance. In 2005, the levels of party identification of democrats and
authoritarians were substantially higher than the ones of the population that did not had a strong
opinion regarding the authoritarian past. This important differences observed in 2005 were almost
nonexistent by 2015. By that year, democrats, authoritarians and the undecided population
recorded similar levels of party identification. Thus, the decline of partisanship during this period
is a consequence of the migration of democrats and authoritarians from identification to
non-identification.
I claim that this decline in the aggregate levels of partisanship is closely related to the active
efforts of the right-wing parties to take distance from the military regime and the figure of
Augusto Pinochet. During the 1990s and 2000s, the main driver of political identification was the
division inaugurated in the national plebiscite of 1988 between supporters and critics of the
dictatorship. The efforts of the right-wing parties to distance themselves from the military
dictatorship had deep consequences both in the levels of identification of the right and the left.
Because the narrative of of the national plebiscite of 1988 stressed the differences between
supporters and opponents of the military dictatorship, once the supporters side of the distinction
disappeared, the narrative lost its capacity to link both right and left wing parties to the mass
public.
In theoretical terms, the Chilean case shows how political identities can be, at the same time,
drivers of political identification, and unstable, a possibility that has been overlooked in the
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existing literature on partisanship (cf. Green and Palmquist, 1994; Green et al., 2002; Huddy
et al., 2015; Kalin and Sambanis, 2018). Party agency plays an essential role in the stability of
partisan identities, and thus without parties continuously reinforcing political opposition and the
key divide that fuels political conflict, identities can dissolve over time. While the U.S case is an
excellent example of how political parties can maintain and reinforce political divisions
continuously through a long period of time, the Chilean case shows the opposite, how political
agency can dissolve those divisions.
While relying on the basic assumption of Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002, that linkages
between parties and citizens are identity based, this approach takes into account the fundamental
role of political agency as a fundamental component of stable political behavior. Linkages
between political parties and citizens can be simultaneously driven by identities and be unstable if
we take into account the relevance of oppositions in the political imaginaries. This important
aspect of the nature of politics is not emphasized in the view of Green, Palmquist and Schickler
2002 while is one of the key elements of Lipset and Rokkan cleavage theory, where politics is
actually built around oppositions Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Identities are politically relevant
only to the extent they are drivers of disagreement, tension and conflict.
In terms of the literature on partisanship in Chile, this article builds up on Torcal and
Mainwaring’s 2003 main claim that it is essential to examine the way in which political elites can
craft party systems from above in order to understand party systems. Political agency can
emphasize or diminish political and class conflicts. Thus, the supply side is as important as the
demand side in order to understand party system formation, maintenance and decay. Political
factors are essential to understand cleavage structures.
One of the implications of the argument of this article is that political identities need continuing
political agency from above in order to persist. In this respect, the original model of political
identities developed in the United States is underspecified. Further comparative research should
evaluate to what extent this argument holds in other settings. To what extent is political conflict
necessary for the persistence of political identities? Can political identities survive without












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Logistic Regression Model Fit - Different Specifications
Age Specification Log-Likelihood Akaike information criterion McFadden R2
Age -4,461.603 8,971.207 0.536
Age2 -4,461.598 8,973.196 0.536
Year of Birth -4,461.603 8,971.207 0.536
Cohort (5 years) -4,461.632 8,971.265 0.536
Cohort (10 Years) -4,461.732 8,971.464 0.536
Voted in Plebiscite (Dummy) -4,461.501 8,971.003 0.536
Voted in Plebiscite + Age -4,461.490 8,972.980 0.536
Source: Universidad Diego Portales Survey.
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Household Asset Indicator as a Measure of Wealt
Following Córdova I use a measure of relative wealth using household asset indicators as an
income indicator. Given that income based measures suffer from both under and over reporting,
and high non-response rates24, households assets present a more precise measure of well-being for
a larger proportion of respondents Córdova (2009).
I use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to estimate the relative wealth of the respondents.
Four main challenges had to be addressed in order to built this measure. First, the UDP National
Survey does not include the same number of goods for each one of the surveys. Second, the
relative value of each one of the goods can change over time. For example, while having a mobile
phone in 2005 could have been interpreted as a sign of wealth in 2005, that was no longer the case
in 2015. Third, the response rates for each one of the household assets varies within and across
surveys. Fourth, a portion of the respondents systematically refused to answer each one of the
household assets questions.
In order to address the first and second challenges, I estimate the Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) for each one of the years separately. This allows me to include all the households assets
available for each one of the years while addressing the concerns of the relative relevance of each
one of the assets across time. Accordingly, the indicator constructed is a measure of relative
wealth for each one of the years.
In order to deal with non-responses to one or more of the household assets, I used two imputation
methods available in the pcaMethods package: svdImpute and bpca. The first one of them
estimates missing values using a linear combination of the most significant predictors. The second
one, implements a Bayesian PCA missing value estimator Stacklies et al. (2007). the correlation
between both estimations is .999. For the models, I used the variable that was estimated using
the bpca algorithm.
Finally, a portion of the respondents (between 3% and 10% depending on the survey) refused to
answer all of the household assets questions. For those individuals, I used a Hot Deck imputation
approach. In each one of the ways of the waves, the interviewers had to asses the socioeconomic
level of the household based on the characteristics of the neighborhood and the house itself. This
24In the UDP survey, non-response rates for this question vary from 13.7% to 43.8% depending on the year.
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variable is highly correlated with the Household Asset Indicator. I used the mean Household
Asset Indicator score for each one of the socioeconomic levels to impute each one of the missing
observations.
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Female (ref. Male) −0.205∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
Education 0.234∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Income 0.428∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.114) (0.114)
Evangelical (ref. Catholic) 0.030 0.060 0.054
(0.083) (0.085) (0.085)
Other (ref. Catholic) −0.067 −0.037 −0.021
(0.132) (0.133) (0.134)
None (ref. Catholic) −0.221∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗ −0.204∗∗
(0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Cohort (5 years) −0.011 −0.006 −0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Perception Economy: Same (ref. Better) −0.603∗∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗ −0.596∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
Perception Economy: Worse (ref. Better) −0.385∗∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
Year (Centered at 2005) −0.131∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.030
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023)
Authoritarian (ref. Undecided) 1.066∗∗∗ 1.730∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.180)






Intercept −0.863∗∗∗ −1.663∗∗∗ −2.103∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.233) (0.263)
Region Fix Effects X X X
Observations 6, 496 6, 496 6, 496
McFadden R2 0.215 0.611 0.612
Log Likelihood -3,821.281 -3,744.605 -3,733.430
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,688.562 7,539.210 7,520.860
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
48
Table 6: Multinomial Regression Model with Economic Perceptions
Party Identification (ref. None)
Alliance Concertation Other
(1) (2) (3)
Female (ref. Male) −0.142 −0.176∗∗ −0.221∗
(0.088) (0.069) (0.132)
Education 0.364∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.091
(0.069) (0.053) (0.104)
Income 0.049 0.049 0.126
(0.134) (0.102) (0.196)
Evangelical (ref. Catholic) −0.085 0.059 −0.130
(0.206) (0.160) (0.339)
Other (ref. Catholic) −0.457∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗
(0.137) (0.101) (0.157)
None (ref. Catholic) 1.000∗∗∗ 0.141 0.029
(0.179) (0.139) (0.259)
Cohort (5 years) −0.042∗∗∗ −0.018∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.023)
Perception Economy: Same (ref. Better) −0.644∗∗∗ −0.598∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.085) (0.159)
Perception Economy: Worse (ref. Better) −0.295∗∗ −0.428∗∗∗ −0.282
(0.120) (0.096) (0.183)
Year (Centered at 2005) −0.088∗∗ −0.0003 −0.002
(0.035) (0.032) (0.048)
Authoritarian (ref. Undecided) 1.824∗∗∗ 1.744∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗
(0.247) (0.259) (0.420)
Democratic(ref. Undecided) 0.548∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.227) (0.354)
Authoritarian*Year −0.099∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.129∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.069)
Democratic*Year −0.003 −0.126∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗
(0.039) (0.034) (0.053)
Intercept −3.491∗∗∗ −2.795∗∗∗ −4.301∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.348) (0.568)
Region Fix Effects X X X
Observations 6, 496
McFadden R2 0.606
Log Likelihood −5, 603.225
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11, 368.45
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Female (ref. Male) −0.205∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
Education 0.234∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Income 0.428∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.114) (0.114)
Evangelical (ref. Catholic) 0.030 0.060 0.054
(0.083) (0.085) (0.085)
Other (ref. Catholic) −0.067 −0.037 −0.021
(0.132) (0.133) (0.134)
None (ref. Catholic) −0.221∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗ −0.204∗∗
(0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Cohort (5 years) −0.011 −0.006 −0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Government Evaluation: Inequality −0.603∗∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗ −0.596∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
Year (Centered at 2005) −0.385∗∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
Authoritarian (ref. Undecided) −0.131∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.030
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023)








Constant −0.863∗∗∗ −1.663∗∗∗ −2.103∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.233) (0.263)
Region Fix Effects X X X
Observations 4, 895 4, 895 4, 895
McFadden R2 0.421 0.712 0.712
Log Likelihood -3,821.281 -3,744.605 -3,733.430
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,688.562 7,539.210 7,520.860
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: Multinomial Regression Model with Inequality Evaluation
Party Identification (ref. None)
Alliance Concertation Other
(1) (2) (3)
Female (ref. Male) −0.134 −0.268∗∗∗ −0.228
(0.104) (0.081) (0.155)
Education 0.441∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.114
(0.082) (0.062) (0.122)
Income 0.065 0.068 0.116
(0.159) (0.119) (0.228)
Evangelical (ref. Catholic) 0.041 0.056 −0.282
(0.232) (0.187) (0.432)
Other (ref. Catholic) −0.363∗∗ −0.268∗∗ 0.259
(0.158) (0.118) (0.186)
None (ref. Catholic) 1.281∗∗∗ 0.179 0.080
(0.221) (0.165) (0.308)
Cohort (5 years) −0.032∗ −0.020 0.136∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.026)
Government Evaluation: Inequality 0.139∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.088∗
(0.034) (0.026) (0.050)
Year (Centered at 2005) −0.057 −0.065 0.063
(0.051) (0.042) (0.069)
Authoritarian (ref. Undecided) 1.628∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗ 0.978
(0.399) (0.359) (0.694)
Democratic(ref. Undecided) 0.555 1.543∗∗∗ 1.814∗∗∗
(0.378) (0.306) (0.578)
Authoritarian*Year −0.078 −0.057 −0.107
(0.060) (0.055) (0.094)
Democratic*Year −0.008 −0.060 −0.189∗∗
(0.055) (0.044) (0.075)
Intercept −5.233∗∗∗ −2.740∗∗∗ −4.664∗∗∗
(0.594) (0.448) (0.785)
Region Fix Effects X X X
Observations 4, 895
McFadden R2 0.715
Log Likelihood −4, 058.585
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8, 273.17
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Revista de ciencia poĺıtica (Santiago) 28 (2), 143–160.
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